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Abstract—The Internet of Medical Things (IoMT)-enabled e-
healthcare can complement traditional medical treatments in a
flexible and convenient manner. However, security and privacy
become the main concerns of IoMT due to the limited com-
putational capability, memory space and energy constraint of
medical sensors, leading to the in-feasibility for conventional
cryptographic approaches, which are often computationally-
complicated. In contrast to cryptographic approaches, friendly
jamming (Fri-jam) schemes will not cause extra computing cost
to medical sensors, thereby becoming potential countermeasures
to ensure security of IoMT. In this paper, we present a study
on using Fri-jam schemes in IoMT. We first analyze the data
security in IoMT and discuss the challenges. We then propose
using Fri-jam schemes to protect the confidential medical data of
patients collected by medical sensors from being eavesdropped.
We also discuss the integration of Fri-jam schemes with various
communication technologies, including beamforming, Simulta-
neous Wireless Information and Power Transfer (SWIPT) and
full duplexity. Moreover, we present two case studies of Fri-
jam schemes in IoMT. The results of these two case studies
indicate that the Fri-jam method will significantly decrease the
eavesdropping risk while leading to no significant influence on
legitimate transmission.
Index Terms—Internet of medical things; network security;
friendly jamming
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the rapid technological advances in big data,cloud computing, machine learning/deep learning and
Internet of Things, more powerful and convenient applications
become available [1]–[5]. Among all the applications in dif-
ferent fields, the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) as an
ecosystem consisting of connected medical sensors, computing
systems and clinical systems has drawn extensive attention in
recent years due to the significant improvements in efficiency
and quality of healthcare services [6], [7]. In IoMT system, the
medical sensors collect the physiological data of patients and
send them to a database repository, in which the authorized
health practitioners (e.g., doctors, nurses) can access and take
corresponding medical measures according to the collected
physiological data of patients [8]–[11]. IoMT can be used
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to provide remote real-time health monitoring, studying the
effect of treatment, and offering elderly healthcare in hospitals
and even at home. Therefore, the IoMT is believed to be a
promising solution to the absence of medical resource and
avoid unnecessary hospitalizations. Compared with traditional
healthcare services, the IoMT will reduce the medical cost
and promote the scale and flexibility to enable the reliable
and qualified healthcare services [12], [13]. Moreover, with
the help of IoMT system, the frequency of close face-to-
face contact between patients and healthcare providers (e.g.,
doctors, nurses) shall be significantly reduced. This manner is
beneficial to prevent the spread of infectious diseases like new
corona-virus (i.e., COVID-19) [14].
Although IoMT system provides effective and reliable
healthcare services for patients and doctors, it faces serious
security challenges due to the vulnerabilities of leaking the
patients’ sensitive medical information [15]–[17]. In particular,
the sensitive medical information collected by medical sensors
is transmitted to data servers via the open wireless channel
connected to the Internet. During this process, malicious users
may wiretap (or eavesdrop) the confidential and sensitive
information, thereby leading to the serious information leakage
of patients [18], [19]. Conventional cryptographic techniques
have been commonly employed to protect the security of
wireless communications. The current approaches to protect
the security of medical data in IoMT are mainly relying
on cryptographic techniques, such as identity authentication
[20]–[23], access control [24]–[30] and data encryption [31]–
[33]. Nevertheless, the computational-resource requirements
for most cryptographic schemes are not feasible for medical
sensors which are limited in computational capability, memory
space and energy capacity [34], [35].
In contrast to computational-complex cryptographic ap-
proaches, physical layer security provides a cost efficient
way to protect the wireless communications by exploiting the
inherent characteristics of the wireless channel [36]. Among all
the methods of physical layer security, Friendly jamming (Fri-
jam) is an efficient and effective method to reduce the received
Signal-to-Interference-and-Noise Ratio (SINR) at the eaves-
dropper while having no requirement on Internet of Things
devices [37]. The Fri-jam is a method that injects Fri-jam
signals to increase the noise level at the eavesdropper, and the
eavesdropper is unable to successfully decode the confidential
messages. The benefits of this method include low computa-
tional capability requirement, low implementation complexity,
few exchanges of coordination messages and no processing of




Acronyms Terms Acronyms Terms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard MISO Multiple-Input Single-Output
BLE Bluetooth Low Energy NFC Near-Field Communication
BS Base Station NOMA Non Othogonal Multiple Access
CPU Central Processing Unit OFDMA Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access
CRN Cognitive Radio Network PCO Probability of the connection outage
CSI Channel State Information PSO Probability of the secrecy outage
D2D Device-to-Device PPP Poisson Point Process
ECG Electrocardiogram RFID Radio Frequency Identification
FD Full Duplex SINR Signal-to-Interference-and-Noise Ratio
Fri-jam Friendly Jamming SWIPT Simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
HD Half Duplex SOR Secrecy outage region
IC Integrated Circuit Chip SIC Successive Interference Cancellation
IoMT Internet of Medical Things UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
conventional Fri-jam schemes, the power allocation between
the legitimate information signal and the Fri-jam signal at
the transmitter is a critical problem to be solved, revealing
the trade off between enhancing the legitimate channel by
increasing the power allocated to information-bearing signal
and degrading the eavesdropper’s channel by allocating more
power to the Fri-jam signal [39]. In this paper, the power
allocation problem can be solved by introducing friendly
jammers into the IoMT individually, leading to no power
consumption on the legitimate transmitters in this network.
As a result, the proposed Fri-jam methods are feasible for
resource-constrained wireless devices especially for medical
sensors in IoMT.
To the best of our knowledge, there are few studies on
protecting the communication security of IoMT with Fri-
jam schemes. To fill this gap, this paper aims to present
an overview on using Fri-jam schemes in IoMT. The main
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We analyze the medical information security of IoMT.
To be specific, we illustrate a 3-layer architecture of
IoMT system consisting of data collection layer, data
management layer and medical server layer. We then
evaluate current security schemes to IoMT and identify
the main security challenges in IoMT.
• Considering security challenges in IoMT, we propose Fri-
jam schemes to secure the confidential medical data of
patients collected by medical sensors. We also discuss the
integration of Fri-jam schemes with other communication
technologies such as Simultaneous Wireless Information
and Power Transfer (SWIPT), beamforming and full
duplexity so as to further improve the performance.
• We also introduce two case studies to verify the effective-
ness of Fri-jam schemes. The results of these two case
studies indicate that Fri-jam methods can significantly re-
duce the success probability of eavesdropping behaviour
while leading to no significant influence on legitimate
transmission when they are properly designed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides security analysis on IoMT. Section III introduces Fri-
jam schemes for protecting the medical data of IoMT. Section
IV presents case studies of Fri-jam schemes. The conclusions
and future work of this paper are given in Section V. Table I
summarizes the main terms as well as their acronyms in this
article.
II. SECURITY ANALYSIS ON IOMT
In this section, we provide a security analysis on IoMT.
Specifically, we first present an illustration on the system
architecture of IoMT. We then introduce some current security
schemes for IoMT. At last, we discuss the security challenges
in IoMT.
A. System Architecture of IoMT
Figure 1 illustrates the IoMT system architecture considered
in this paper. This IoMT system architecture consists of
three layers: data collection layer, data management layer and
medical server layer, similar to recent studies such as [8],
[40]–[42]. The medical sensors in data collection layer collect
the physiological data of patients and send the collected data
to the data servers located in data management layer after
necessary preprocessing at edge servers, which are depolyed
in approximation to patients. The data servers in data man-
agement layer store, process and analyze the collected medical
data with a provision of the access interfaces to the authorized
healthcare providers (such as doctors) in medical server layer.
After processing and analyzing physiological information of
patients at medical server layer, the healthcare providers as
well as practitioners (e.g., medical doctors and nurses) can
offer the professional advice to patients or take emergency
measures. We then introduce the three layers of IoMT in
details.
1) Data collection layer: The data collection layer is com-
posed of medical sensors, mobile devices and edge servers.
The medical sensors are sensor devices that implanted, worn
or connected to daily items such as clothes. Medical sensors
collect multi-source physiological data of patients, such as
temperature, blood glucose, blood pressure, blood oxygena-










Fig. 1. System architecture of IoMT.
In emergency scenarios, strict monitoring will be performed.
The medical sensors will continuously collect the important
physiological data, which will be temporarily stored at a
mobile device (such as smart phones, laptops and tablets).
While in normal scenarios, intermittent monitoring will be
performed according to the request of the authorized persons
(e.g., patient, doctor or nurse, etc.). The medical sensors
will collect patient data at frequent intervals. Each medical
sensor is wirelessly connected to a dedicated mobile device
via the low-power wireless technologies, such as Near-Field
Communication (NFC), RFID and Bluetooth Low Energy
(BLE) [46]. After preprocessing the collected data, the mobile
device will transmit the data to the edge server, which is
usually deployed close to patients.
The edge servers that are typically mounted at wireless
accessing devices (such as wireless routers, IoT gateways
and base stations) and interact with different types of local
networks compatibly [8]. At the edge server, the original
heterogeneous data in different structures and formats have
been preprocessed and aggregated locally before sending to
the next layer [47]. Compared with medical sensor devices
and mobile devices, edge servers have much stronger com-
putational capability and sufficient power supply. Therefore,
edge servers can provide the secure data transmission between
data collection layer and data management layer with stronger
encryption algorithms. In addition, with the consent of patient,
the applications for early diagnosis and rehabilitation progress
assessment can be performed on the edge server. The edge
servers can also generate alarm signals to alert the patient
or doctor when any vital physiological parameter reaches a
threshold.
Both security and privacy in the data collection layer pose
challenges especially due to the limitations of computational
capability and power supply of the medical sensor devices and
mobile devices. Therefore, the security methods of this layer
are required to be less computationally-complex and cause
less communication overhead. We will present the explicit
discussion on data collection layer in Section II-C.
2) Data management layer: The main aim of data manage-
ment layer is to uniformly manage the received heterogeneous
data from data collection layer. The received medical data
should be processed and analyzed according to the timeliness
of medical data and the priority of analysis tasks. In this
layer, storage resources and computing facilities are provided
to store, process, and analyze the collected physiological data.
In order to process huge volumes of medical data, most
of studies adopt the distributed processing models in the
data management layer, such as [8], [9], [30], [40]. Those
distributed mechanisms for efficient data processing, analysis
and storage are typically integrated with big data, cloud
computing and storage technologies. Consequently, the data
analysis based on cloud computing will significantly reduce
the computing time and the data storage on the cloud will
bring the ubiquitous convenience of accessing data anytime
and anywhere.
The data security and patient privacy are important issues
since patients’ physiological data is stored at the data servers
for a long time. Therefore, the data must be encrypted when
being stored at the data management layer. Based on the strong
computational-capability of data management facilities (like
clouds), complicated and strong data encryption algorithms
can be adopted to protect the data security and patient privacy.
In addition, some identity authentication and access control
mechanisms are also feasible to this layer. The details of these
methods are introduced in Section II-B.
3) Medical server layer: In this layer, the healthcare pro-
fessionals (e.g., doctors, nurses) which have authentication and
authorization credentials are able to access patients’ physiolog-
ical data. After the process and analysis on the physiological
data of patients in data management layer, the healthcare
professionals are provided by visual data analytical results in
this layer.
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When the physiological data of patient is changing, the
healthcare professionals can immediately discover it and take
corresponding measures. The professional advice from hospi-
tals and medical research centers to patients may reduce the
number of visits to doctors and examinations. In addition, the
recovery procedure of a patient can be traced by healthcare
professionals. It is helpful for treatment optimization.
The main requirement of protecting the security of patients’
data in the medical server layer is that only the authorized
healthcare professionals can access the data. Therefore, the
access control mechanisms (such as signatures or certificates)
can be established to ensure that only authenticated users with
access rights can access the data. The policies on health data
sharing to avoid the leakage of patients’ privacy information
are implemented in this layer, too.
B. Current security schemes for IoMT
Security is one of the most important concerns in IoMT
because the privacy sensitive physiological data of patients
can be easily leaked or misused during the whole life cycle of
medical data. The exposure of these data may lead to data
abuse and even social discrimination against patients. The
current approaches used for protecting the security of medical
data in IoMT mainly include identity authentication, access
control and data encryption.
Access control is the method to prevent illegal access
to resources by unauthorized users and to determine the
appropriate level of authority for authorized users. The authors
in [20] proposed a lightweight glass-breaking access control
system which contains two access modes: attribute-based
access and glass-breaking access. The attribute-based access is
used for fine-grained access control in normal situation while
the glass-breaking access is used in emergency situation. In
their proposed system, the collected medical data is encrypted
by the patients themselves. A similar research is given in
[21], where a two-fold flexible access control mechanism is
designed for an IoMT data storage system. This access control
mechanism is self-adaptive for normal scenario and emergency
scenario, which protect the privacy of patients as well as
guarantee the first-aid treatment to the patient when emergency
situation occurs. In [22], the authors proposed a ciphertext-
policy attribute-based encryption algorithm to build an access
control system in IoMT. In this research, the authors addressed
patient privacy issue by hiding the addressed data and en-
crypting the medical records. In research [23], a practical data
collection framework is proposed for preventing insider attacks
and protecting the privacy of patient. The proposed framework
of IoMT utilized a secret sharing scheme based on Slepian-
Wolf-coding algorithm. In this framework, a patient access
control scheme is designed to prevent the data storage servers
from revealing of patients’ privacy.
Identity authentication is a method to validate the identity
of each other and prevent unauthorized entity from accessing
the sensitive medical data. The research [24] investigated a
lightweight IoMT storage system. In this lightweight storage
system, they designed a concrete data integrity verification
scheme to verify the identity of patient and the integrity of
the sensitive physiology data. In [25], the authors provided an
authentication and key agreement protocol, and also provided
an access control mechanism to enhance the information
security and the privacy of patients and doctors. Moreover,
the ownership transfer of the patient and doctor in IoMT
system can be addressed with their proposed protocol. In [26],
an end-to-end scheme for securing IoMT system is designed
based on the handshake process and session resumption tech-
nique. In this scheme, the authentication and authorization
architecture is built and the mobility of medical sensors in
IoMT is considered. The research [27] introduced a secure
IoMT system with privacy-aware aggregate authentication and
access control mechanism. In this system, the authentication
mechanism is designed with an anonymous certificateless ag-
gregate signature scheme, and the access control mechanism is
enabled by anonymous attribute-based encryption. The authors
of research [28] proposed an update mechanism which can be
used to update both authentication keys and session keys with
two-way identity authentication method. This method can be
used to identify and authenticate the legality of heterogeneous
medical sensors. The identity authentication is achieved by the
mechanism of the elliptic curve encryption algorithm signature
as well as symmetric encryption algorithm of session key. An
anonymous authentication scheme to prevent the authenticated
patients from untrusted authentication server is proposed in
[29], where the rotating group signatures based on elliptic
curve cryptosystem is utilized in this scheme. The authors of
[30] first proposed a lattice-based secure cryptosystem and
then designed a mutual authentication scheme based on this
cryptosystem. In addition, they proposed a data encryption
scheme for data storage servers in data management layer on
the foundation of their proposed cryptosystem.
Data encryption is a security method that both sides of
communication transform information according to the agreed
rules. The authors in [31] designed a group send-receive model
and AES based key distribution scheme to realize the secure
data transmission in IoMT. In addition, a homomorphic en-
cryption based on matrix scheme is proposed in this research to
enable a privacy-preserving strategy. A secure data collection
scheme for enhancing the security of data acquisition and data
transmission is proposed in [32]. This data collection scheme
is designed based on two algorithms, one is light-weight FPGA
hardware-based cipher algorithm and the other is secret cipher
share algorithm. In [33], the authors proposed a D2D-assist
data transmission protocol to guarantee the confidentiality
and integrity of the medical data transmission in IoMT. This
protocol is designed based on certificateless generalized sign-
cryption technique.
Table II summarizes the related studies on incumbent se-
curity schemes for IoMT. The current security schemes are
effective for data manage layer and medical server layer in
the 3-tier IoMT healthcare architecture, where the powerful
computing facilities can support computation-complicated and
energy-consumed tasks such as encryption, decryption and
data analytics. However, the security of data collection layer
in IoMT is vulnerable in contrast to data manage layer and
medical server layer. Due to the extensive amount of medical
data generated in IoMT, even light-weight encryption methods
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TABLE II
CURRENT SECURITY SCHEMES FOR IOMT






[20] Designing a lightweight glass-breaking access control system
for IoMT
Access control × × X
[21] Designing a self-adaptive access control mechanism for IoMT
data storage system
Access control × × X
[22] Proposing a privacy-aware IoMT access control system Access control × × X
[23] Proposing a practical data collection framework of IoMT to




[24] Proposing an IoMT storage system to verify the identity of
patient and the integrity of patients’ data
ID authentication × X ×





[26] Proposing an authentication and authorization architecture
where the mobility of IoMT is considered
ID authentication X X X
[27] Proposing an privacy-aware aggregate authentication and access




[28] Designing an update mechanism to update the authentication
keys and session keys
ID authentication × × X
[29] Designing an anonymous authentication scheme to prevent the
authenticated patients from untrusted authentication server
ID authentication × X ×





[31] Proposing a group send-receive model based key distribution
scheme to enhance the security of data transmission
Data encryption X × X
[32] Proposing a secure data collection scheme to guarantee the
security of data acquisition and data transmission
Data encryption X X ×
[33] Proposing a light-weight data transmission protocol to guarantee
the security and primacy of D2D-assist IoMT system
Data encryption X X ×
will lead to the significant cost at resource-strained medical
sensors. Meanwhile, the communication delays introduced by
encryption methods may be disastrous for patients especially
in emergency situations. Therefore, the current access control,
data encryption and authentication mechanisms may not be
feasible for securing the data collection layer due to the limited
computational capability, memory space and energy supply of
the medical sensors.
C. Challenges in security schemes of IoMT
The security challenges in IoMT system may exhibit in
all the layers in the three-layer IoMT architecture while the
security vulnerabilities at data collection layer are more serious
than other two layers. The limitations of medical sensors in
computational capability, memory space and energy supply are
the main root cause for security vulnerabilities. In addition,
the characteristics of medical sensors in variety and mobility
lead to the extra difficulty for designing the feasible security
schemes.
Medical sensors usually have small form factors (e.g., size
and volume). On the one hand, the portable size of medical
sensors brings the convenience of medical applications and
reduce the cost of sensors. However, the portability of medical
sensors, on the other hand, also leads to the limited computing
capability, memory space and power capacity. For example,
their memory is not enough to perform complicated security
protocols, because it will take a long time to perform complex
computing operations and lead to significant delay in data
transmission, which is nevertheless dangerous for patients.
Therefore, most of the current security algorithms are not
suitable for normal operation under the condition of limited
resources. The security scheme suitable for this device should
occupy as few computing and storage resources as possible,
and the requirements for the computing power and storage
space of the medical sensors should be low enough while not
affecting the operation of the sensors.
Although medical sensors have a certain processing ca-
pacity, they will choose to use less energy in most cases
due to the limited battery power. When there is no critical
information to process, they will run at a lower CPU speed
to save energy. When it is not necessary to report sensor
readings, such devices will turning on power saving mode to
save energy. In addition, for some chips (i.e., ICs) implanted
into the human body, replacing them for the lack of power
will result in both pain and high cost. Therefore, the energy
constraint of medical sensor leads to the design challenges of
the security schemes.
There are various types of medical sensors, from mature PC
devices to RFID tags, and even chips embedded in the body.
The computing capability, function, memory, and embedded
software of each type of sensor are different. Therefore,
designing a security scheme that can accommodate even the
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devices with weakest capability is another challenge.
In general, medical sensors are not static but mobile. The
mobility of medical sensors improves the applicability of
IoMT. For example, patients can conduct physical exercises
activities in restricted medical area while being continuously
monitored. In addition, mobility enables patients to move from
their living rooms to other rooms for medical examination
without interrupting the continuously medical monitoring. In
addition, medical sensors may connect or leave the IoMT net-
work at any moment, thereby leading to the dynamic changes
of the network topology accompanied by difficulties in the
central management or secret key distribution. Therefore, it
is also a serious challenge to design a security scheme that
satisfies the mobility requirement.
III. APPLICATION OF FRI-JAM SCHEME IN IOMT
The main idea of Fri-jam schemes is to introduce a certain
number of friendly jammers to wireless networks to produce
jamming signal to the transmission channels to prevent the
eavesdroppers from successfully wiretapping the legitimate
transmissions. In Fri-jam schemes, there is no requirement
of computing capability, memory space and energy supply at
medical sensors. Even those medical sensors with the weakest
capability can be protected by friendly jammers. In addition,
Fri-jam schemes can also be applied to mobile scenarios
of IoMT, where the mobility of medical sensors has little
impact on the performance of Fri-jam schemes as long as
their mobility is limited in a finite area. Moreover, friendly
jammers can be switched off to save the energy when there
is no sensitive medical data transmissions to be protected in
the IoMT. Therefore, Fri-jam schemes are also flexible to be
applied to diverse scenarios. In this section, we introduce the
applications of Fri-jam schemes in IoMT. Specifically, we
first introduce the system of Fri-jam based IoMT. We next
quantify the security of Fri-jam schemes to IoMT. At last, we
summarize the researches on integration of Fri-jam methods
with other techniques to mitigate the interference on legitimate
communication.
A. System Model of Fri-jam Schemes in IoMT
The general IoMT scenario is illustrated in Figure 2, where
multiple medical sensors intend to transmit confidential phys-
iological data of patients to the corresponding mobile devices
in the presence of eavesdroppers. We assume the eavesdropper
is passive and non-colluding all the time, they attempt to
wiretap the messages sent by medical sensors. This assumption
is reasonable since it is easy to discover and locate the
eavesdroppers if the eavesdroppers are active in transmission.
In order to protect the communication security of wireless
network, we deploy friendly jammers at a boundary around
the data transmission region in this network to emit jamming
signals to prevent eavesdroppers from successfully decoding
the legitimate messages. In this section, each device in the
network is equipped with a single omnidirectional antenna.
The number of medical sensors and the number of friendly
jammers are denoted by NT and NJ , respectively. The medical






Fig. 2. Application scenario of Fri-jam scheme in IoMT.
jammers are denoted by { j1, j2, ... , jNT }. Without loss
of generality, we focus on the transmission link between
medical sensor t0 and mobile device r0 as shown in Figure 2.
The information signal transmitted from transmitter t0 may
potentially be eavesdropped by an eavesdropper E. When the
large-scale fading is considered in the wireless channels [37],


























where PT is the transmitting power of medical sensors, PJ
is the transmitting power of friendly jammers, hrn denotes
fading coefficients of the channel between mobile device r0
and medical sensor tn, hrm denotes fading coefficients of the
channel between mobile device r0 and friendly jammer jm,
xn denotes the information-bearing signal sent by transmitter




= 1, zm denotes the Fri-





= 1, drn is the Euclidean distance between
mobile device r0 and medical sensor tn, drm is the Euclidean
distance between mobile device r0 and friendly jammer jm,
α is the path loss factor, and n0 denotes the complex additive
white Gaussian noise.


























where den is the Euclidean distance between eavesdropper E
and medical sensor tn, dem is the Euclidean distance between
eavesdropper E and friendly jammer jm, ne denote complex
additive white Gaussian noise.
After deriving the received signal at a mobile device (or an
IoT gateway), we can calculate the SINR, which is closely
related with performance metrics of information security. The
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rm represents the cumulative interference from
friendly jammers to mobile device r0.
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em represents the cumulative interference from
friendly jammers to eavesdropper E.
B. Security Analysis of Fri-jam Schemes
We next introduce the common performance metrics of
communication security in Fri-jam aided wireless networks.
1) Secrecy Capacity/Rate: In physical layer security, a
principal communication security metric is secrecy capacity,
which is used to describe the largest amount of information
that can be confidentially communicated between a legitimate
transmitter and a legitimate receiver from the information-
theoretic secrecy perspective.
Specifically, the definition of secrecy capacity is the differ-
ence between the legitimate link capacity and the eavesdrop-
ping link capacity [51]–[54], where the legitimate link capacity
is the capacity between a legitimate transmitter and a legiti-
mate receiver, the eavesdropping link capacity is the capacity
between the legitimate transmitter to the eavesdropper. The
secrecy capacity denoted by Cs is expressed as follows
Cs , [Cr − Ce]+ , (5)
where Cr = log2 (1 + γr) denotes the legitimate link capac-
ity and Ce = log2 (1 + γe) denotes the eavesdropping link
capacity. The difference between two capacities essentially
determines the secrecy capacity.
In practice, the value of γe depends on the information
decoding sensitivity at an eavesdropper. When γe decreases,
the less information can be wiretapped by the eavesdropper.
Once γe is below the information decoding sensitivity, no
information can be wiretapped by the eavesdropper.
The physical meaning of secrecy capacity can be expressed
as the upper bound of the transmission rate which satisfy the
condition of reliability and secrecy.
2) PCO and PSO: For the assumption that eavesdroppers
are passive and seldom transmit signals, the instantaneous
knowledge of γe is difficult to be obtained. The perfect secrecy
capacity is unavailable if the instantaneous knowledge of γe is
absent. Therefore, research studies employ probability of the
connection outage (PCO) and probability of the secrecy outage
(PSO) to measure the security [49], [55], [56]. PCO and PSO
are corresponding to the connection outage (CO) event and the
secrecy outage (SO) event, respectively. The CO event occurs
when the receiving SINR at the legitimate receiver is lower
than a given threshold γth while the SO event occurs when the
receiving SINR at the eavesdropper is above a given threshold
γeth [57]–[59].
Mathematically, the PCO can be calculated as
PCO = Pr (γr < γth) = FγD (γth) , (6)
where F (·) denotes the cumulative distribution function.
Similarly, the PSO can be calculated as
PSO = Pr (γe ≥ γeth) = 1− FγE (γeth) . (7)
To derive the PSO, the statistical knowledge instead of
instantaneous knowledge of γe is required. The physical mean-
ing of PCO is the probability of a unsuccessful transmission,
while the physical meaning of PSO is the probability that the
transmission fails to reach the perfect secrecy. The goal of
introducing Fri-jam signals to wireless networks is to reduce
the PSO while maintaining the PCO low enough, i.e., to
enhance the security along with the reliability guarantee of
wireless communication.
3) Secrecy Outage Region: The placement strategies of
friendly jammers are investigated to improve the secrecy
efficiency in recent studies including [48], [60], [61]. In these
schemes, the area of secure regions and unsecured regions are
secrecy metrics to evaluate the transmission security of the
network.
In particular, in [48], secrecy outage region (SOR) is pro-
posed to investigate the influence of geometric locations of
eavesdroppers on secrecy outage event. In [60], the metric
audible region is a region in which any eavesdropper located
inside will lead to γe ≥ γeth if no jammer is introduced;
jamming region is a region where any eavesdropper located
inside will lead to γe < γeth if jamming signal is introduced.
In [61] the authors proposed Fri-jam strategy based on their
defined jamming region and masking region. The physical
meaning of secrecy outage region is the amount of area where
secrecy outage event occurs.
Summary. The above security metrics have been widely
adopted in recent studies. In particular, the secrecy capacity,
secrecy rate and probability of secrecy outage mainly focus
on the analysis from the perspective of information theory
while secrecy outage region concentrate on the locations of the
eavesdroppers. From the illustration of performance metrics,
we find the information security of wireless network heavily
depends on the SINR of eavesdropper and that of legitimate
receiver.
C. Integration of Fri-jam Schemes with Other Techniques in
IoMT
Fri-jam is a promising approach to protect the confidential
information of legitimate communications from being wire-
tapped by eavesdroppers. Nevertheless, from the expressions
of SINR at legitimate receiver and at eavesdropper in Eq. (3),
we find that the Fri-jam signals also bring interference at legit-
imate users. Therefore, multiple techniques are investigated to
integrate with Fri-jam schemes for the purpose of mitigating
the impact of jamming signals on legitimate transmissions or











Fig. 3. Integration of Fri-jam with Beamforming.
1) Integration of Fri-jam with Beamforming: Compared
with conventional omni-directional transmissions, beamform-
ing concentrates the signals to the desired direction by taking
advantage of spatial degrees of freedom. Figure 3 shows a
scenario in which Fri-jam is integrated with beamforming
techniques. In this scenario, the power of Fri-jam signal is
concentrated on the eavesdropper so that the interference of
the friendly jammer on legitimate transmission is reduced.
Several recent studies attempt to investigate the joint impact
of beamforming and Fri-jam. In particular, the influence of
beamforming and Fri-jam on large scale spectrum sharing
networks was investigated in [39], in which the exact analytical
expressions of average secrecy rate and SOP are derived
and the results are helpful for designing the optimal power
allocation strategy. Meanwhile, the research [51] investigated
Fri-jam aided beamforming scheme in multi-input single-
output multi-eavesdropper (MISO-ME) wiretap channel. Their
results on secrecy outage proved that null-space Fri-jam is an
optimal solution when the number of antennas equipped by
eavesdropper is arbitrary. In [62], the authors jointly designed
Fri-jam aided beamforming and power splitting technique
to protect the security of legitimate data transmission and
minimize the transmitting power in a MISO CR network with
SWIPT. The secrecy rate constraint, interference constraint
and EH constraint are considered in this design. Furthermore,
Nguyen et al. [63] proposed the joint optimization strategy of
the information signals and beamforming of Fri-jam signals
to maximize the secrecy rate considering MISO broadcast
channel in an underlay cognitive radio network (CRN). In this
optimal beamforming design, the secondary user eliminated
the interference of friendly jammers with zero-forcing method.
In the investigation of joint beamforming and Fri-jam
schemes, the Channel State Information (CSI) is important
and it is assumed to be known or unknown. In this aspect,
the article [64] proposed a semi-adaptive scheme, where the
secrecy rate will be adaptively adjusted following the CSI of
legitimate channel under the fixed transmission rate. In [65],
the authors investigated secure transmission designs to jointly
optimize the beamforming vector and the covariance matrix
of jamming signals. In this research, authors also analyze
two different cases of eavesdroppers’ CSI being known and
unknown. Moreover, the article [66] investigate to maximize
the secrecy rate in the worst-case in a Fri-jam aided amplify-
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is imperfect. Zhang et al. [67] proposed a Fri-jam aided
optimal beamforming scheme in a two-layer physical layer
security model. This model can be used for protecting the
security of higher level information while satisfying the low-
level information secrecy rate constraint.
2) Integration of Fri-jam with SWIPT: As one of the most
promising technologies to extend the operation time of low-
power networks with constrained energy (e.g., IoMT), SWIPT
enables the devices to obtain information and acquire energy
from the same signal [68]–[70]. On the other hand, Fri-jam
schemes are suitable to wireless networks in which wireless
devices are limited in low battery power and poor computa-
tional capability so that the computational-complex encryption
algorithms cannot be used. The integration of SWIPT with Fri-
jam may potentially improve the security of wireless networks
while extending life time of wireless networks [71].
Figure 4 illustrates a scenario of integrating Fri-jam with
SWIPT. In this scenario, friendly jammers also serve as
power providers for legitimate transmitters. When the legit-
imate transmitters are located close to the friendly jammers,
the energy in the Fri-jam signals is harvested by legitimate
transmitters. In addition, the legitimate transmitters can also
act as power providers for friendly jammers, as in [70], [72].
The related studies of integration of Fri-jam with SWIPT
can be roughly categorized into two types according to their
transmission protocols.
(a) Harvest-then-jam protocols. In [70] and [72], friendly
jammers are considered as energy-constrained nodes without
embedded power supply, they firstly harvest radio frequency
(RF) energy from emitted by the legitimate transmitters ac-
cording to the proposed protocols, and then utilize the acquired
energy to interfere with the eavesdropper. Specifically, the
secrecy performances of two types of legitimate receivers are
studied in [72], where the first type of receivers could cancel
the jamming interference with prior knowledge while the other
type of receivers could not.
In [49], the authors proposed a SWIPT based full-duplex
self-jamming (SWIPT-FDSJ) scheme in energy-constrained
SWIPT networks. In this scheme, the legitimate receiver first
harvests energy from legitimate transmitters with the maximal
ratio transmission protocol and then sends jamming signals to
prevent the eavesdropping behaviour. Compared with no self-
jamming scheme with half-duplexity, SWIPT-FDSJ scheme
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leading to the improvement of secrecy throughput.
In a Fri-jam aided secure OFDMA system with SWIPT, [69]
designed a Fri-jam aided transmission strategy in frequency-
domain to optimally allocate both power and subcarrier to de-
rive the maximal weighted sum value of information receivers’
secrecy rate. This strategy is designed on the condition of
individual energy receivers’ minimum harvested power. The
work of [73] investigates a wireless-powered sensor network,
in which the access point transmits energy signals to supply the
power to sensor nodes and friendly jammer. With the harvested
energy, friendly jammer then sends jamming signals to confuse
eavesdropper. In this research, the security performance of
wireless sensor network considering Nakagami-m channels
are studied since the transmission distance in wireless sensor
network is short.
In a multiple-Input Single-Output based non-orthogonal
multiple access (MISO-NOMA) cognitive radio network re-
lying on SWIPT, Zhou et al. [74] proposed a Fri-jam aided
cooperative jamming scheme to enhance the communication
security of the primary network. In this work, the practical
non-linear energy harvesting model was considered, rather
than the ideally linear energy harvesting model. The non-
linear EH model is also employed by the Fri-jam aided
multi-cell coordinated beamforming scheme to secure SWIPT
transmitting schemes in [68]. The centralized and distributed
versions were individually designed to guarantee the security
of legitimate users’ information and the requirements of energy
harvesting.
(b) Harvest-then-relay-and-jam protocols. In [75] and [76],
the harvest-then-relay-and-jam protocols are employed for the
wireless transmission. In the first transmission phase, each
relay receives the wireless information and wireless power si-
multaneously from legitimate transmitters. In the second trans-
mission phase, the relay nodes split the harvested power into
two parts: one part is used to relay the legitimate information
signal and another part is used to transmit the Fri-jam signals
to the eavesdroppers. Specifically, semi-definite relaxation-
based algorithms are designed to derive the maximal value
of the achievable secrecy rate at the legitimate receiver as
in [75], [76]. In particular, in [75], the centralized case with
global CSI and the distributed case with only local CSI of
relays are investigated. The joint optimization of covariance
matrix of Fri-jam and the beamforming vector when the CSI
is perfect and the worst-case robust optimization when the CSI
is imperfect is investigated in [76].
In [52], Lee et al. investigated a Fri-jam aided wireless-
powered relay network, where the legitimate receivers act as
friendly jammers and relay nodes receive the energy from
both legitimate transmitters and legitimate receivers to forward
data signal simultaneously. Harnessing power splitting and
time switching techniques, Lee et al. proposed two relaying
schemes which are effective for practical environments under
the condition that the CSI of eavesdropper is unknown.
3) Integration of Fri-jam with Full duplexity: Full duplex
(FD) technology has attracted much attention in physical layer
security due to the high spectral efficiency compare with
the conventional half duplex (HD) communications. Figure 5
shows a scenario that Fri-jam is integrated with full duplex
communications. In this case, the FD legitimate receiver
transmits Fri-jam signals and receives the information signals
simultaneously.
Integrating Fri-jam schemes with FD technology has been
studied in recent research studies. In [37], Zheng et al. studied
a decentralized wireless network where the FD legitimate
receivers generate jamming signals to confound eavesdroppers
and receive the signals from legitimate transmitters simul-
taneously. In this network, a spatial Successive Interference
Cancellation (SIC) strategy for deploying the FD receivers
optimally is proposed to derive the maximal value of network-
wide secrecy. The accurate integral expressions and analytical
approximations for COP and SOP are provided based on
a stochastic geometry framework. In [77], a precoded Fri-
jam signal injection scheme is designed for an FD MIMO
relay channel. In this scheme, the friendly jammer is an FD
device and the ambient radio-frequency transmissions supply
the power for the friendly jammer.
Hu et al. [78] proposed a two-phase Fri-jam aided secure
transmission scheme. In the first phase of this scheme, a FD
transmitter transmits Fri-jam signals and receives another inde-
pendent Fri-jam signals from a HD receiver simultaneously. In
the second phase of this scheme, the transmitter superimposes
the confidential information signal with the received Fri-
jam signals from the receiver, then transmits the composed
signals which can be decoded by the receiver only while the
eavesdropper cannot. The average secrecy rate and the SOP
of this scheme are analyzed under the Rayleigh block-fading
channel.
Bi and Chen [70] considered to secure the communication
with a wireless powered FD friendly jammer, which harvests
energy and generates jamming signals simultaneously. In this
work, an accumulate-and-jam protocol is designed to max-
imize the amount of harvested energy of the FD jammer.
Similarly, Li [79] proposed Fri-jam aided precoding strategy,
where the multiple-antenna legitimate transmitter transmits
confidential information signals and the Fri-jam signals simul-
taneously.
IV. CASE STUDIES OF FRI-JAM SCHEME IN IOMT
Fri-jam schemes have been widely proposed to safeguard
transmissions in wireless networks. Moreover, these Fri-jam
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IoMT. As shown in Figure 6, there is usually a protection
region in IoMT (e.g., the entrance requiring permissions),
where the eavesdropper cannot enter. Meanwhile, if the eaves-
droppers appear inside the medical-care centers (e.g., a clinic
or a hospital), they can be easily identified. Therefore, eaves-
droppers are typically restricted externally while they can still
wiretap the confidential information due to the openness of
wireless medium.
In such a scenario, we only need to consider eavesdroppers
who are outside the medical center. Herein, we present two
specific case studies to introduce applications of Fri-jam
schemes in IoMT.
A. Case I: Beamforming-assisted Fri-jam
Firstly, we introduce a scheme integrated with beamforming
technique firstly introduced in [80]. In particular, we consider
that the medical center is surrounded by a finite circular
region as shown in Figure 6(a). In this data transmission
region, multiple medical sensors transmit physiological data
of patients to mobile devices. The distribution of medical
sensors are assumed to follow the Poisson point process
(PPP), and the expectation number of medical sensors is M .
The mobile devices which receive the collected data from
medical sensors are assumed to locate at the center of this
data transmission region. In this scenario, an eavesdropper
E is trying to eavesdrop the sensitive medical information
in the data transmission region. The distance between this
eavesdropper and the circular boundary of data transmission
region surrounded by friendly jammers is D.
Aiming at protecting the medical data of patients from
being wiretapped by eavesdropper, we introduce N friendly
jammers into this data transmission region. The placement
strategy of friendly jammers are shown in Figure 6(a), where
we place friendly jammers at the circular boundary of the
data transmission region. In this case, the mobile device, the
medical sensors and the eavesdropper emit signals omnidi-
rectionally. With regard to friendly jammers, two jamming
strategies are designed for this scenario: (i) OFJ scheme,
where friendly jammers emit signals omnidirectionally; (ii)
DFJ scheme, where friendly jammers emit directional signals
with beamforming technique. A scheme named by NFJ is
designed as a comparison group, in which no deployment of
Fri-jam is conducted.
After deriving PSO via stochastic geometric approaches,
we can obtain PSO of the above schemes. Meanwhile, we
have also conducted simulations to verify the effectiveness of
our analytical model. From Figure 7(a), we can find that the
introduction of friendly jammers into the data transmission
region will result in the reduction on PSO. For instance, when
the expectation number of medical sensors M is 4, in contrast
to the NFJ scheme, the decrease of PSO with OFJ scheme
is 0.5988 (i.e., 62.21 % decreased). When M remains to be
4, in contrast to the NFJ scheme, the decrease of PSO with
DFJ scheme is 0.6304 (i.e., 65.50% decreased). Therefore,
the DFJ scheme results in the more significant reduction of
PSO compared with OFJ scheme. This result indicates that
applying Fri-jam schemes in the network can mitigate the
success probability of eavesdropping behaviour.
As shown in Figure 7(b), the curve of PSO drops rapidly
when the parameter N increases. In particular, when friendly
jammers are using beamforming technique (i.e., in DFJ
scheme), the decrease of PSO is even more significant. This
result is helpful in verifying the effectiveness of Fri-jam
schemes (i.e., OFJ and DFJ schemes) in reducing the PSO
of IoMT. The results of Figure 7(b) imply that deploying
too many friendly jammers in the IoMT may be unnecessary,
especially in the DFJ scheme. In DFJ scheme, the PSO reduces
significantly as long as a few friendly jammers is introduced.
For instance, when the number of friendly jammers N is 6,
in contrast to NFJ scheme, the decrease of PSO in the DFJ
scheme is 0.3937 (i.e., 72.72% reduction).
Another set of simulation results are given in Figure 7(c),
where the PSO values of different schemes are compared in
terms of the varied distance between the eavesdropper and
the network boundary denoted by D. As presented in Figure
7(c), three schemes have the rapidly-decreased PSO values.
This phenomenon becomes significant especially in the NFJ
scheme. This result indicates that the impact of path loss is
more obvious on legitimate signal than on jamming signal.
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(a) Number of medical sensors M varies from 1 to
10
(b) Number of friendly jammers N ranges from 1
to 16.
(c) Distance D varies from 2 to 20.
Fig. 7. Probability of secrecy outage (PSO) for Fri-jam scheme.
Figure 7(c) also verified the effectiveness of Fri-jam schemes
in reducing the PSO of IoMT compared with the NFJ scheme.
B. Case II: UAV-assisted Fri-jam
Recently, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been
widely applied in wireless communications to substitute some
disrupted transmitting nodes to extend the network coverage
or serve as relays [81]. UAVs can also be used as friendly
jammers. In particular, a UAV-assisted Fri-jam scheme is
introduced in [82], where UAVs are considered as jammers
to disturb the eavesdropper. In particular, as depicted in
Figure 6(b), a UAV jammer flies surrounding the protection
region. A directional antenna is mounted at each UAV jammer.
The jamming signal is emitted by the directional antenna from
the UAV jammer toward ground to disturb the eavesdropper.
Thanks to the mobility of UAV, the jamming region can
flexibly move to cover the eavesdropper. Next, we evaluate
the anti-eavesdropping performance of the UAV-assisted Fri-
jam scheme by the PSO.
The PSO can be used to evaluate the probability of wiretap-
ping activity for each location of the eavesdropper. Figure 8
plots PSO for UAV-assisted Fri-jam (U-FJ) scheme deployed
in IoMT. As shown in Figure 8, the darkest blue stands for
the lowest PSO, whereas the lightest yellow stands for the
highest PSO. The color from yellow to blue implies that the
intensity of the PSO decreases. The inner white circular area is
the protection region where the legitimate IoMT transmissions
are conducted. Figure 8(a) illustrates the PSO for IoMT when
there is no UAV jammer deployed. We can find that most
of the surrounding area outside the protection region are
in yellow, implying that the legitimate communications in
IoMT have high chance to be eavesdropped. Both Figure
8(b) and Figure 8(c) show the PSO for IoMT when UAV
jammer is deployed. In particular, in Figure 8(b), the ratio
of transmit power Pt of IoMT to jamming power Pj of UAV
jammer is 10 : 1. It implies that, compared with the power
consumption of transmissions by medical sensors, the UAV
jammer consumes less. Moreover, we find that most of the
areas outside the protection region are changed from yellow
to blue. It means that the eavesdropping risks are significantly
reduced, although the jamming power is small. As shown in
Figure 8(c), the yellow-covered areas are further reduced as
the jamming power is increased to the same value of transmit
power of IoMT. Consequently, we can conclude that U-FJ
scheme can effectively reduce the PSO in IoMT.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Traditional medical treatment methods requiring extensive
resources to be concentrated on medical agencies (e.g., hos-
pitals and clinics) cannot cater for the rising demands on
healthcare especially for aging population or outbreak of
epidemic diseases. The advent of IoMT can complement tradi-
tional healthcare services in a flexible and convenient manner.
However, both security and privacy become the main concerns
of IoMT due to vulnerabilities of IoMT devices, which have
the limited computational capability, memory space and power
capacity. Therefore, conventional cryptographic approaches
may not be feasible for IoMT devices. Different from conven-
tional cryptographic security countermeasures which have a
strong requirement on computational capability of end devices,
Fri-jam schemes have neither specific requirements on end
devices nor modifications on existing network infrastructures.
Therefore, there are a number studies on Fri-jam schemes in
wireless networks.
In this paper, we investigate the usage of Fri-jam schemes in
IoMT. In particular, we illustrated the three-layer architecture
of IoMT system consisting of data collection layer, data
management layer and medical server layer. We then present
some current security schemes and analyzed the main security
challenges of IoMT. We next propose to use Fri-jam schemes
to protect the confidential medical data of patients collected
by medical sensors from being eavesdropped. The secrecy
performance metrics which are commonly used to evaluate
the information security are also presented. Moreover, the
integration of Fri-jam schemes with other communication
technologies such as SWIPT, beamforming and full duplexity
is also discussed. In addition, we introduce two case studies
of Fri-jam schemes in IoMT. From the analytical results of
these two case studies, we find that the Fri-jam method will
significantly reduce the probability of secrecy outage while
causing no significant influence on legitimate transmission as
12
(a) Without UAV jammers (b) With UAV jammers (Pt : Pj = 10 : 1). (c) With UAV jammers (Pt : Pj = 1 : 1).
Fig. 8. PSO for UAV-assisted Fri-jam scheme (better viewed in color).
long as friendly jammers are properly placed. We believe that
the integration of Fri-jam schemes with other communication
technologies (beamforming and full duplexity) can further
improve the performance.
Future work will be focus on further improving the security
performance of IoMT systems. Another approach to control
the propagation environment to ensure that the eavesdropper
does not get a change to receive the legitimate signals is
to introduce intelligent reflective surfaces (IRS) [83], [84].
In line with the jamming principal, this solution will enable
the walls to change their reflective and absorption properties
to ensure that the wireless signal is appropriately contained
within a secure environment. This approach is also a potential
solution to the security challenges in data collection layer of
IoMT systems since most of the legitimate communications
in this layer are within an indoor environment [11]. In the
future, we will explore the integration of Fri-jam schemes with
IRS schemes and the joint consideration of these two schemes
according to the specific IoMT communication environment.
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